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AIDING AND ABETTING PERSECUTORS:
THE SEIZURE AND RETURN OF HAITIAN
REFUGEES IN VIOLATION OF THE U.N.
REFUGEE CONVENTION AND PROTOCOL
ANDREW I. SCHOENHOLTZ*
I. INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to Executive Order 12,807 of May 23, 1992, the "Ken-
nebunkport Order," United States Coast Guard cutters have been in-
tercepting boatloads of Haitian citizens in international waters off the
coast of Haiti and turning them over to the Haitian authorities in Port-
au-Prince. No questions are being asked to determine if any of these
citizens are bona fide refugees fleeing persecution. All are simply
returned.'
Does the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (Protocol),' to
which the United States is a party,3 permit the U.S. government to do
* B.A., Hamilton College, 1973; Ph.D., Brown University, 1982; J.D., Harvard Law School,
1986. The author is an attorney at Covington & Burling in Washington, D.C. He represents the
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights as an amicus in the McNary case. The author is grateful
to John W. Douglas and Carlos M. Vdzquez for their helpful suggestions on earlier drafts of this
Article.
1. President Bush initiated this policy, which is presently being enforced by President Clinton.
The Clinton Administration is pressing for a political solution to the ouster of President Aristide
and the human rights abuses being carried out by the present military regime in Haiti, and says
that its policy of enforcing the Kennebunkport Order is temporary. See Ruth Marcus & Al
Kamen, Aides Say Clinton Will Extend Policy on Returning Haitians, WASH. POST, Jan. 14,
1993, at A25; see also WASH POST, Jan. 15, 1993, at Al, A16. Both during the campaign and
after his election, President Clinton vowed to change the summary return policy. See Statement of
Governor Bill Clinton on Haitian Refugees, U.S. Newswire, July 29, 1992 available in LEXIS,
Nexis library, Wires File ("I am appalled by the decision of the Bush Administration to pick up
fleeing Haitians on the high seas and forcibly return them to Haiti before considering their claim
to political asylum .... This process must not stand."); Clinton Statement on Appeals Court Rul-
ing on Haitian Repatriation, U.S. Newswire, July 29, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Wires File ("The Court of Appeals made the right decision in overturning the Bush Administra-
tion's cruel policy of returning Haitian refugees to a brutal dictatorship without an asylum hear-
ing."); Governor Clinton Reaffirms Opposition to Bush Administration's Policy on Haiti, U.S.
Newswire, Sept. 9, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File ("I want to reaffirm my
opposition to the Bush Administration's cruel policy of returning Haitian refugees to their oppres-
sors in Haiti without a fair hearing for political asylum."); BILL CLINTON & AL GORE, PUTTING
PEOPLE FIRST: How WE CAN ALL CHANGE AMERICA 119 (1992) ("Stop the Forced Repatriation
of Haitian Refugees-Reverse Bush Administration's policy, and oppose repatriation"); see also I
Intend to Look Beyond Partisanship... to Help Guide Our Nation', WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1992,
at AI0 ("I'm going to change the policy.").
2. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S.
267.
3. As a party to the Protocol, the United States has agreed to abide by Articles 2 through 34
of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150. At pre-
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this? That question is now before the United States Supreme Court."
Regarding United States obligations under the Protocol, the United
States government claims that the United States may seize refugees
and return them to a country of persecution, as long as such refugees
are not within United States borders. This Article examines the Con-
vention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Convention) and the Proto-
col in light of that claim.
First, to understand why the Protocol is central to the United States
government's claim, I briefly present the workings of United States
statutory law insofar as that law concerns refugees. Essentially, if refu-
gees reach our borders, the United States cannot return them to a
country of persecution. This the United States government recognizes.,
As to the high seas, the United States asserts that neither our domestic
statutes nor the Protocol apply. Since our domestic statutes are consis-
tent with the obligations the United States undertook in ratifying the
Protocol, this Article focuses on the Protocol: if the Protocol applies to
refugees on the high seas, so does our statutory law.
Second, I describe the history of the United States interdiction policy
towards Haitians and the executive branch positions concerning the ap-
plication of the Protocol on the high seas. At the inception of the in-
terdiction program, the Reagan Administration asserted that the
United States would abide by its obligations under the Protocol not to
return interdicted refugees to Haiti. Once litigation challenging the in-
terdiction program ensued, however, the executive branch argued, at
least in court, that our Protocol obligations do not apply on the high
seas.
Finally, I analyze the scope of the convention and Protocol with re-
spect to their core protection: the obligation undertaken by contracting
States not to return refugees to countries of persecution. From an ex-
amination of the terms of the nonrefoulement obligation, it is clear that
contracting States cannot seize refugees on the high seas and deliver
them into the hands of their persecutors. Thus, it is inappropriate to
look to the negotiating history of the Convention to interpret the
nonrefoulement obligation. But even if it were appropriate, that history
does not clarify or resolve any textual ambiguities. In short, by turning
back refugees interdicted on the high seas directly to a country of per-
secution, the United States is violating the nonrefoulement obligation.
The conclusion that the obligation applies to refugees on the high
seas does not mean that the United States must admit a single refugee
sent, 115 countries are parties to either the Convention or the Protocol, or both.
4. Haitian Ctrs. Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52
(1992) (No. 92-344).
5. See Brief for Petitioners at 30-31, McNary v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, cert. granted, 113 S.
Ct. 52 (1992) (No. 92-344).
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to its territory. It simply means that the United States cannot reach
out beyond its shores to return refugees to a country of persecution.
Several commentators have confused these two different obligations.
But the power to refuse admission does not include or in any way au-
thorize the power to return a refugee to a country of persecution. Con-
tracting States may attempt to find other nations to accept refugees, or
do nothing-the Convention does not obligate contracting states to ad-
mit refugees. But it does flatly prohibit their return to a country of
persecution.
Most importantly, the position advanced by the United States gov-
ernment-that any party to the Convention or the Protocol is free to
evade the nonrefoulement obligation by seizing refugees before they
enter that party's territory and returning them to their persecutors, all
under an agreement with those very persecutors--is wholly inconsis-
tent with the humanitarian purpose of, and protections provided by, the
Convention and Protocol. Neither the text, structure, nor negotiating
history of the Convention provide any support whatsoever for such a
depraved interpretation of Article 33.
II. UNITED STATES STATUTORY LAW REGARDING REFUGEES
Those fleeing persecution who are fortunate enough to make their
way to the United States border, as well as those who enter United
States territory, can apply for two kinds of protection. Pursuant to the.
Refugee Act of 1980 (Refugee Act),' the Attorney General is obligated
not to return to a country of persecution a bona fide refugee who dem-
onstrates that his life or freedom would be threatened there. Techni-
cally, this is called "withholding of deportation." 8 A refugee who re-
ceives only this form of protection is not admitted into the United
States for potentially permanent residence, however, the Attorney Gen-
eral may, in his discretion, grant asylum to that refugee.9 Asylum is a
refugee's first step towards permanent residence.
Whether at the border or already within the United States, all refu-
gees who apply for recognition of their special status are considered to
be applying for both forms of protection. Congress required that fair
and adequate procedures be employed in the determination of refugee
status and asylum in accordance with the humanitarian intent of the
6. See Agreement Between the United States of America and Haiti, Sept. 23, 1981, U.S.-
Haiti, 33 U.S.T. 3559, T.I.A.S. No. 10,241.
7. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (1988)).
8. INA § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988).
9. INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1988). To qualify for the discretionary grant of asylum, the
refugee must demonstrate a "well-founded fear" of persecution. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. 421 (1987). Withholding of deportation is mandatory upon the higher showing of a "clear
probability" of persecution. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
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Refugee Act.10 Today these include a full-fledged hearing before an
immigration judge with representation by counsel (pro bono or at the
refugee's expense) as well as administrative and judicial appeals."
The United States provides these procedures and protections in ac-
cordance with its obligations under the Protocol.1 The central obliga-
tion-that of non-return or nonrefoulement-is found in Article 33 of
the Convention. Withholding of deportation is the domestic law
equivalent of the nonrefoulement principle. Once someone fleeing per-
secution is determined to be a refugee, that person cannot be returned
to any territory where he or she would be persecuted. The Attorney
General can follow any of the following courses of action: (1) admit the
refugee into the United States; (2) temporarily detain him and keep
him separated from the public; or (3) find another country to provide
refuge. But she cannot return the refugee to the persecuting country.
So much is clear under our statutory law once a refugee reaches our
shores, but what if the United States stops people on the high seas?
The Supreme Court is considering that question in McNary both with
respect to our immigration statutes and the Protocol." The analysis
here focuses only on the question in relation to the Protocol. It is axio-
matic that, in passing the Refugee Act, Congress amended the text of
existing statutes to make them consistent with our Protocol obliga-
tions." Thus, if the Protocol applies to refugees on the high seas, then
the Refugee Act does as well. Even if that were not the case, the self-
executing nonrefoulement provision of the Protocol applies indepen-
dently as the law of the land.' 5
III. UNITED STATES INTERDICTION POLICY
The United States has directed its force outside its borders against
citizens of one country-and only one country-in an effort to stop
those fleeing their homeland from reaching the United States border.
The United States has been interdicting Haitians for over a decade
based on a 1981 agreement reached between "Baby Doc" Duvalier and
President Reagan.' 6
Three phases of the United States interdiction policy towards Hai-
10. See INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1988).
11. See 8 C.F.R. § 208 (1992).
12. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987).
13. See 969 F.2d at 1366-67. In support of its holding that the withholding of deportation
statute applies to all aliens, including those on the high seas, the Second Circuit found that the
Protocol applies to refugees on the high seas. Thus, the direct issue as presented to the Supreme
Court concerns the Protocol to the extent that it informs the interpretation of the INA.
14. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 436-37.
15. On the self-executing nature of the nonrefoulement provision and its independent applica-
tion as the law of the land, see Carlos Vzquez, The "Self-Executing" Character of the Refugee
Protocol's Nonrefoulement Obligation, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 39 (1993).
16. See Agreement Between the United States of America and Haiti, supra note 6.
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tians can be identified. During the first phase, the Reagan Executive
Order authorizing the policy stated that refugees were not to be re-
turned to Haiti. To enforce what the order itself called "the strict ob-
servance of our international obligations concerning those who genu-
inely flee persecution in their homeland,"1  Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) officers interviewed Haitians aboard
Coast Guard cutters. In practice, the INS officers determined that only
eleven of the almost 23,000 Haitians interviewed had plausible refugee
claims.1" Those eleven Haitians were brought to the United States to
pursue their claims within the framework of the domestic asylum sys-
tem, where they were entitled to hearings and other due process protec-
tions afforded to those refugees who reach our shores.
Phase II began with the exodus of Haitians following the military
coup of September 1991 that ousted President Jean-Bertrand Aristide
from power. The policy maintained during this part of the Bush Ad-
ministration was not to return refugees. During the initial exodus, the
INS officers continued to interview Haitians on the cutters. However,
the number of those fleeing increased such that the cutters were or-
dered to bring all interdicted Haitians to the United States Naval base
at Guantdnamo Bay for interviews.
In order to interview the Haitians held at Guantdnamo, the INS dis-
patched a significant number of its asylum corp specialists to the naval
base. Reportedly better versed than cutter interviewers on Haitian po-
litical affairs and able to hold slightly longer interviews in a somewhat
improved setting, the INS specialists determined that approximately
10,300 of some 36,600 had plausible refugee claims and should be
brought to the United States to apply for asylum.19
Phase III started when President Bush issued a new executive order
on May 23, 1992, the so-called Kennebunkport Order, authorizing the
Coast Guard to return all Haitians found on the high seas, regardless
of refugee status. The Kennebunkport Order eliminated the "strict ob-
servance of our international obligations concerning those who genu-
inely flee persecution in their homeland." Instead, the new order pro-
vided that "the Attorney General, in his unreviewable discretion, may
decide that a person who is a refugee will not be returned without his
consent." Grace did not abound; all Haitians have been returned under
the new order.
17. Exec. Order No. 12,324, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,109 (1981), reprinted in 8 U.S.C. § 1182 app. at
1259 (1988).
18. Haitian Advocates Challenge U.S. Repatriation of Haitian Refugees in Court, AILA
MONTHLY MAILING (Am. Immigr. Lawyers Assoc., Washington, D.C.), Jan. 1992, at 30.
19. 69 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1066 (1992).
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IV. THE UNITED STATES LEGAL POSITIONS
The United States government has argued to the Supreme Court
that the obligation of the United States not to return refugees to a
country of persecution under Article 33 does not apply on the high
seas. That was not always the position of the executive branch.
Well before the creation of the Haitian interdiction program, U.N.
Ambassador Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr., stated the United States
view on the scope of Article 33 in light of the forced return of
Vietnamese boat people:
It is difficult to overemphasize the significance .. . in making cer-
tain that no refugee is required to return to any country where he
would face persecution .... Article 33 of the Convention contains
an unequivocal prohibition upon contracting states against the
refoulement of refugees 'in any manner whatsoever' . . . . My
government joins with the [U.N.] High Commissioner [for Refu-
gees] in condemning the inhumane practice of refoulement.2 °
In 1981, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) at the Department of
Justice opined on the legality of the proposed interdiction of Haitian
flag vessels with respect to United States obligations under the Proto-
col. OLC took the position that "[i]individuals who claim that they will
be persecuted . . . must be given an opportunity to substantiate their
claims" under the Protocol. 1
The Office of the Attorney General confirmed this interpretation in a
November 13, 1981 letter to the ranking minority member of the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee, Edward M. Kennedy.2 2 The letter states
emphatically:
[T]he United States will not return persons to a country of perse-
cution. Immigration and Naturalization Service officers will be
stationed on board the Coast Guard vessel to carry out our obliga-
tions under the United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees ...
The INS officers have been directed to be constantly watchful,
as they speak to each individual, for any indication that a person
may qualify as a refugee under the U.N. Convention and Proto-
col. . . . If an interview suggests that a legitimate claim to refugee
status exists, the person involved will be removed from the inter-
20. Statement on Nov. 25, 1974 to the Third Committee of the U.N. General Assembly, re-
printed in A. ROVINE, OFFICE OF LEGAL ADVISOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, DIGEST OF UNITED
STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1974, at 11I (1975) (emphasis added).
21. 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 242, 248 (1981).
22. United States as a Country of Mass First Asylum: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., Ist Sess.
208-09 (1981) [hereinafter Mass Asylum Hearing].
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dicted vessel, and his or her passage to the United States will be
arranged. Upon reaching the United States, a formal application
for asylum may be made. These procedures fully comply with our
responsibilities under the U.N. Convention and Protocol.
Persons already within or at the borders of this country apply
for asylum under the U.S. immigration laws .... Aliens who have
not reached our borders (such as those on board interdicted ves-
sels) are not protected by our immigration laws, but rather only
by the U.N. Convention and Protocol.2
3
Both the Acting INS Commissioner and the Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs testified to the same position regard-
ing the applicability of the Protocol on the high seas at the inception of
the interdiction program. 24
But once litigation ensued, the Executive changed its views, at least
in court.2 5 In 1985, the Department of Justice argued to the D.C. Cir-
cuit in Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey2a that the Protocol does not
obligate the United States to refrain from any action regarding refu-
gees outside the territory of the United States. That view was followed
again in exchanges between the Legal Adviser of the Department of
State and OLC in December 1991, amidst the Phase II challenge to
the interdiction program before the Eleventh Circuit. 7
V. THE SCOPE OF ARTICLE 33
The U.N. Refugee Convention does not require contracting states to
admit bona fide refugees. But its core protection, found in Article 33,
ensures that a refugee will not be placed in the hands of a persecuting
government:
23. Id. The last paragraph is quoted above for its relevance regarding the scope of Article 33.
The view that our domestic law is not in accord with our international obligations under the
Protocol is contradicted by the Refugee Act.
24. See Id. at 4 (Statement by Thomas 0. Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs, regarding the Haitian interdiction program: "I would like to also underscore
that we intend fully to carry out our obligations under the U.N. Protocol on the status of refu-
gees"); id. at 20 (Statement by Doris Meissner, Acting INS Commissioner: "procedures would be
established to comply with our international obligations relating to refugees"); Asylum Adjudica-
tion: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 21-22 (1981) (Statement by Doris Meissner, Acting INS
Commissioner: in interviewing interdicted Haitians, "[t]he INS officer's responsibility on the ship
is to insure that we are in compliance with the U.N. protocol. ... ).
25. After the Executive branch changed its views in court, the Deputy Commissioner of the
INS, James Buck, testified that in administering the interdiction program, the INS had "strictly
observ[ed] our international obligations concerning those who are genuinely fleeing persecution in
their homeland." Haitian Detention and Interdiction: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immi-
gration, Refugees, and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. 28 (1989).
26. 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
27. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1245 (1992).
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Article 33.-Prohibition of expulsion or return ("refoulement")
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a ref-
ugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories
where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group
or political opinion.
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be
claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for re-
garding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is,
or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particu-
larly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that
country.
No reservations to Article 33 are allowed.2 8
Does Article 33 protect refugees on the high seas? To answer that
question, we first examine the text of the article.
A. The Terms of Article 33
Unless the terms of an international agreement are ambiguous or
obscure, or lead to an unreasonable result, the ordinary meaning of the
text controls."
Paragraph 1 of Article 33 sets forth the nonrefoulement prohibition
in broad terms. Notably, the only geographic reference therein con-
cerns the place to which the refugee cannot be returned. No explicit
mention is made as to the place from which the obligation not to return
arises.
This is hardly surprising. First, the very definition of refugee set
forth in the Convention imposes only one geographic requirement for
individuals to qualify for protection:
[T]he term 'refugee' shall apply to any person who.., owing, to a
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
28. Convention, supra note 3, at art. 42.
29. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31, 32, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
Although the United States has signed but not ratified the Vienna Convention, the Department of
State, in submitting this treaty for ratification to the Senate, stated that the Convention "is al-
ready recognized as the authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice." S. EXEC. Doc. L.,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1971). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES, introductory note to part III (1987) ("The Department of State has on
various occasions stated that it regards particular articles of the Convention as codifying existing
international law; United States courts have also treated particular provisions of the Vienna Con-
vention as authoritative." (citing, inter alia, cases applying art. 31)).
In addition to applying the Vienna Convention regarding the primacy of the ordinary meaning
of treaty terms, U.S. courts also use principles analogous to those that guide courts in construing
statutes to the same effect. See Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 134 (1989) ("We
must thus be governed by the [treaty] text"); United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 371 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (if "the Treaty's language resolves the issue presented, there is no neces-
sity of looking further to discover 'the intent of the Treaty parties' ").
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nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection
of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being
outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of
such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return
to it.30
As in Article 33, the refugee is defined in connection with the country
of persecution. The only geographic requirement that qualifies a person
as a refugee is that he be outside that country."1
Second, when defining who is a refugee and what protection such a
person must be accorded, the nations that drafted Article 33 in 1950
and 1951 focused on the needs of refugees based particularly on the
Western European experience during and following the Second World
War. As the terms of the provision indicate, the drafters assumed that
the refugees would be either within the country of refuge or at the
country of refuge's border. The notion that a contracting state would
reach beyond its territory to seize and return refugees to authorities
who would persecute them was unimaginable. To suggest that such
conduct is not prohibited by Article 33 would mean that the drafters
deviously carved out a loophole so contracting states could avoid the
nonrefoulement obligation.
This certainly was not the case. The Convention aimed to protect
refugees in one fundamental way: to prevent them from being placed in
the hands of persecutors. Moreover, the framework of State power as
understood then and today argues strongly against the notion that a
State could do on the high seas what it could not do in its own terri-
tory. If a State lacks the power to return a refugee who is present
within its territory, where the State's jurisdiction is otherwise plenary,
afortiori it lacks the authority to reach beyond its territory, where its
jurisdiction is more tenuous, and return a refugee to a persecuting
nation.
Indeed, the United States' authority to exercise jurisdiction over
Haitians on the high seas is based in part on an agreement with Ha-
iti. a1 It is simply ludicrous to suggest that the drafters of Article 33
30. Convention, supra note 3, at art. I(A) (emphasis added).
31. See also UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCE-
DURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS V 28 (1979) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
The UNHCR Handbook counsels that a person is a refugee "as soon as he fulfills the criteria
contained in the definition. This would necessarily occur prior to the time at which his refugee
status is formally determined." The Handbook is based on UNHCR's experience, the practice of
States in determining refugee status, and the literature devoted to the subject over the years.
"[T]he Handbook provides significant guidance in construing the Protocol . . . [and] has been
widely considered useful in giving content to the obligations that the Protocol establishes." INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 439 n.22 (1987).
32. See supra note 6.
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intended to permit parties to return to the persecuting state refugees
over whom they obtained jurisdiction on the basis of an agreement with
the persecuting state. Such conduct virtually amounts to aiding and
abetting the persecution from which it is the purpose of Article 33 to
protect the refugee.
The fact that no mention at all is made in Article 33(1) or the refu-
.gee definition as to where outside the country of persecution a refugee
presently is located takes on greater significance in the context of the
numerous Convention provisions that explicitly limit obligations and
correlative rights to a refugee's presence in the country of refuge. Not
surprisingly, these provisions generally concern matters that would only
occur within the territory of the country of refuge: general obligations
of the refugee (Article 2), freedom of religion (Article 4), right of asso-
ciation (Article 15), employment (Articles 17 through 19), housing
(Article 21), public relief (Article 23), employment benefits and social
security (Article 24), freedom of movement (Article 26), identity pa-
pers (Article 27), and travel documents (Article 28). The Convention's
explicit and consistent use of terms to indicate geographic limitation
reinforces the understanding that the nonrefoulement obligation, where
no such language is found, applies with respect- to all refugees, whether
within or outside of the country of refuge.
While the nonrefoulement obligation found in paragraph 1 of Article
33 does not contain any explicit geographic limitation, it is necessary to
examine the two terms of Article 33 that do have geographic references
to determine if they restrict the obligation in such a manner.
In forbidding contracting states from "expelling" or "returning" ref-
ugees to countries of persecution, Article 33 appears to have three situ-
ations in mind. First, refugees might be lawfully within the territory of
a country of refuge. Second, they could be there unlawfully. Third,
they could be outside the territory of the contracting state.
Article 32, entitled "Expulsion," appears to be the best source of the
meaning of the term "expel" in Article 33. It provides special protec-
tions regarding the expulsion of refugees lawfully within a contracting
state's territory.33 Not all refugees are entitled to the special protec-
tions guaranteed to those legally within a country of refuge. In short,
when Article 33 prohibits the expulsion of refugees to countries of per-
secution, that obligation relates to those refugees legally within a coun-
try of refuge.
The other two categories of refugees-those unlawfully within a
33. Article 32(1) prohibits the expulsion of such refugees to any country (persecuting or not),
except on grounds of national security or public order. Under Article 32(2), fair procedures ensur-
ing due process are required when the exceptions are invoked. Finally, pursuant to Article 32(3),
the refugee must be allowed a reasonable period of time to seek admission into another country if
the exceptions are invoked and fairly applied.
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State's territory and those outside it-are referenced by the French
term for return, refouler-4 As Professor Goodwin-Gill has explained,
the general meaning of refouler is:
to drive back or to repel, as of an enemy who fails to breach one's
defences. In the context of immigration control in continental Eu-
rope, refoulement is a term of art covering, in particular, sum-
mary reconduction to the frontier of those discovered to have en-
tered illegally and summary refusal of admission of those without
valid papers.35
The 1933 Convention relating to the International Status of Refugees,
for example, required in Article 3 that contracting parties undertake
not to remove resident refugees or keep such refugees from their terri-
tory, "by application of police measures, such as expulsions or non-ad-
mittance at the frontier (refoulement)," unless dictated by reasons of
national security or public order.3 6
A similar usage of refouler concerning immigrants dates back to
1846:
Faire reculer, refluer (des personnes). . . .Refouler des immi-
grants, des indisirables, ?7 la frontibre 37
This usage continues today in the immigration context:
La d6cision du pr6sident Bush d'ordonner A la garde coti6re amer-
icaine de refouler les boat-people haitiens vers leur He pour tenter
de mettre fin A un v6ritable exode a suscit6 . . . "a suprise et 1'
inqui6tude" du haut-commissaire des Nations unies pour les
refugi6s . 8
34. The English and French texts of the Convention are equally authentic. See Convention,
supra note 3, at 184. Refouler is found in both.
35. Guy S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 69 (1983).
36. Oct. 28, 1933, 159 L.N.T.S. 205 (official text in French); GooDWIN-GILL, supra note 35,
at 70. We know that refouler had the same meaning at the time Article 33 was written because
the French delegate to the Convention's drafting committee explained that "[iin France and
Belgium . . . refoulement meant either deportation as a police measure or non-admittance at the
frontier." Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, U.N. ESCOR, 21st mtg.
at 4-5, U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/SR.21 (1950) (emphasis added). The Belgian delegate "agreed with
that explanation," leading the British delegate to "conclude[] from the discussion that the notion
of 'refoulement' could apply to ... refugees seeking admission." Id. at 5. While refoulement refers
in part to non-admittance at the frontier, the nonrefoulement obligation found in Article 33 does
not impose an admission requirement, which would make it an asylum provision. Rather, the
obligation is that a refugee shall not be returned to a country of persecution. The focus of Article
33 is on the consequences to the refugee of expulsion or return.
37. This translates as: "To drive back or to repel. To drive back immigrants, undesirables, at
the border." (italics in original) LE PETIT ROBERT: DICTIONNAIRE ALPHABtTIQUE & ANA-
LOGIQUE DE LA LANGUE FRANcAISE 1492 V 3 (1973).
38. Jean-Michel Caroit, HAITI: en dbpit des mesures prises par les Etats-Unis, I 6xode con-
tinue [HAITI: Despite Measure taken by the United States, the Exodus Continues] LE MONDE,
May 29, 1992, at 4 (emphasis added). President Bush's decision to order the U.S. Coast Guard to
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[L] es Etats-Unis ont decid6 de refouler directement les refugi6s
recueillis par la garde coti6re.39
This understanding of refouler is fully consistent with the equally
authoritative English word "return" in Article 33. Standing without
the limiting geographic terms found in other Convention articles and in
the context of a broadly worded prohibition, the word "return" only
references the place to which refugees cannot be sent. Its plain mean-
ing does not limit in any way the place from which the refugee cannot
be turned back.
From the above analysis, two conclusions can be drawn. First, the
meaning of the terms "expel" and refouler is clear. Second, neither
these nor any other terms of Article 33(1) limit the nonrefoulement
obligation to refugees Within a contracting state's territory.40
One further textual aspect of Article 33 requires examination. While
the general prohibition of Article 33(1) does not contain any explicit or
return the Haitian boat people to their island in order to put an end to a true exodus "suprised
and troubled" the United Nations High commissioner for Refugees. Id. (translation). Respondents
cite this and the following example from a French newspaper to demonstrate the ordinary meeting
of refouler. See Respondents' Brief at 16 n.24. McNary v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, cert. granted,
113 S. Ct. 52 (1992) (No. 92-344).
39. BULLETIN Le bourbier haitien [Bulletin The Haitian Quagmire], LE MONDE, June 1,
1992. (emphasis added) (The United States decided to directly return the refugees picked up by
the Coast Guard).
40. Several commentators disagree with this understanding of Article 33 based on the notion
that since the Convention does not require states to admit refugees, it does not extend its central
protection to the unadmitted. But the latter does not follow from the former: the power to refuse
admission does not include or in any way authorize the power to return a refugee to a country of
persecution. Nonrefoulement does not obligate a state to permit refugees to enter. States can turn
refugees away, as long as those refused entry are not returned to a country of persecution. For
commentators confusingthe power to admit with the power to return, see II GRAHL-MADSEN, THE
STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 94 (1972) (in a chapter entitled "A Right to be
Granted Asylum," stating in a conclusory fashion that Article 33 "may only be invoked in respect
of persons who are already present-lawfully or unlawfully-in the territory of a Contracting
State," and then observing that Article 33 "does not obligate the Contracting States to admit any
person who has not already set foot on their respective territories.") (emphasis added); N. ROBIN-
SON, CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES: ITS HISTORY, CONTENTS AND INTER-
PRETATION 162-63 (1953) (same flaw, even though author observes that "there was agreement in
the Ad Hoc Committee that 'refoulement,' existing in Belgium and France and unknown else-
where, means either deportation as a police measure or non-admission at the frontier,"); Aga
Khan, Legal Problems Relating to Refugees and Displaced Persons, 149 HAGUE ACADEMY OF
INT'L LAW 287, 318 (1976) (on whether the nonrefoulement obligation applies to refugees who
present themselves at the frontier, states, "It is intentional that the Convention fails to mention
asylum as a right which the contracting States would undertake to grant to a refugee who,
presenting himself at their frontiers, seeks the benefit of it.") (emphasis added); Note, The Right
of Asylum Under United States Law, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1125, 1126-27 (1980) (describes Article
33 as "the Protocol's basic asylum provision" and observes, "This right of asylum ... does not
extend to refugees outside the contracting country's borders.") (emphasis added); Kay Hailbron-
ner, Non-Refoulement and "Humanitarian" Refugees: Customary International Law or Wishful
Legal Thinking?, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 857, 861-62 (1986) ("The plain language of the 1951 Refu-
gee Convention demonstrates a reluctance of states to enter into far-reaching obligations to grant
admission to, as opposed to non-return of, refugees.... The coverage of nonrefoulement, based on
these standards, is limited to those who have already entered state territory, either lawfully or
unlawfully.").
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implicit geographic limitations, the narrow exceptions to this core pro-
tection found in paragraph two of the article refer only to those refu-
gees within the country of refuge's territory.
As a general matter, the territorial reference in Article 33(2) is per-
fectly consistent with the above understanding of Article 33(1): the for-
mer concerns a subset (those within the country of refuge) of the latter
(refugees both within and outside of a country of refuge). Specifically,
the geographic limitation regarding the criminal exception (conviction
by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime) is best understood
when viewed together with the one relating to the criminal exclusion
ground found in Article 1(F)(b). There, a person is excluded from the
protection of the Convention altogether if "there are serious reasons for
considering" that he has committed "a serious non-political crime
outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a
refugee.""' Since serious crimes committed outside the country prior to
admission are already grounds for excluding a refugee from the protec-
tion of Article 33, it would be redundant to repeat them in that Article.
Instead, the exceptions stated in Article 33 concern events that arise
following entry into a country of refuge that endanger the community
or national security.
Substantively, then, Article 33(2) is logically limited to refugees
within the country of refuge. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly,
this limitation is textually restricted to the second subparagraph of Ar-
ticle 33. To read it into the first subparagraph is to rewrite the text.
In sum, the proposition that the nonrefoulement obligation applies to
refugees wherever they are outside the country of persecution is fully
supported by the terms and structure of Article 33.
B. The Negotiating History of Article 33
Even though the language of Article 33 is clear, at least two federal
judges as well as the Solicitor General of the United States have relied
on an excerpt from the negotiating history to read a geographic limita-
tion into Article 33(1).'I
The negotiating history of the Convention begins with the convening
of an Ad Hoc Committee consisting of representatives of thirteen gov-
ernments to consider the desirability of preparing a new convention re-
garding the international status of refugees and stateless persons.'3 Pre-
41. Convention, supra note 3, at art. l(F)(b).
42. See Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 840-41 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Edwards, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); McNary, 969 F.2d at 1377-79 (Walker, J., dissenting);
Brief for Petitioners at 42-43, McNary v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52
(1992) (No. 92-344).
43. On the procedural history presented in this and the following paragraph, see RoBmsoN,
supra note 40, at 4-5.
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vious international agreements did not address the situation of the
numerous refugees produced by the Second World War, so following a
study by the Secretary General, the U.N. Economic and Social Council
(Council) appointed the Ad Hoc Committee. On January 16, 1950, the
Ad Hoc Committee convened in Lake Success, New York, and com-
pleted its initial work on February 16, 1950, with the adoption of a
Draft Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and a Protocol
thereto relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. Following discus-
sions of the draft within the Council and among governments, the Ad
Hoc Committee met in Geneva from August 14 to August 25, 1950,
and prepared a revised draft.
This draft was submitted to the General Assembly, which convened
a conference of plenipotentiaries in Geneva from July 2 to July 25,
1951, to complete the drafting. This final drafting provided an opportu-
nity for more governments to participate. Twenty-six states were repre-
sented by delegates and two governments by observers. The Conference
adopted the Convention by a vote of twenty-four to none.
The prohibition on returning refugees to a country of persecution
was as far as the Convention drafters went with respect to the immedi-
ate protection provided to refugees in flight. The Ad Hoc Committee
considered, but rejected, a chapter requiring the admission of refugees
into a contracting state." However, that decision did not in any way
restrict the application of the nonrefoulement obligation. In discussing
the latter obligation in relation to the Ad Hoc Committee's decision not
to impose an admission obligation, which would amount to asylum,
then-U.S. delegate Louis Henkin stated:
It did not, however, follow that the convention would not apply to
persons fleeing from persecution who asked to enter the territory
of the contracting parties. Whether it was a question of closing
the frontier to a refugee who asked admittance, or of turning him
back after he had crossed the frontier . . . . [W]hatever the case
might be . . . .he must not be turned back to a country where
his life or freedom could be threatened. No consideration of public
order should be allowed to overrule that guarantee, for if the State
concerned wished to get rid of the refugee at all costs, it could
send him to another country or place him in an internment
camp.' 5
44. Summary Record of the Seventh Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and
Related Problems, held Jan 23, 1950, 1st. Sess. at 13, U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/SR.7 (1950).
45. Summary Record of the Twentieth Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness
and Related Problems, held Feb. 1, 1950, 1st Sess. at 11-12, U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/SR.20 (1950).
In a December 15, 1992 affidavit submitted by respondents in McNary [hereinafter Henkin Affi-
davit], now-Professor Henkin states:
George Warren attended the Conference of Plenipotentiaries as the U.S. delegate at the
July 11 and 25, 1951 sessions, but he and I had no disagreement regarding this point. My
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Speaking immediately after Mr. Henkin, the Israeli delegate fully
concurred with the U.S. position:
The [nonrefoulement] article must, in fact, apply to all refugees,
whether or not they were admitted to residence; it must deal with
both expulsion and non-admittance, and must grant to all refugees
the [nonrefoulement] guarantees ...
The Committee had already settled the humanitarian question
of sending any refugee whatever back to a territory where his life
or liberty might be in danger.46
Apparently, there was some concern "that the right of nonrefoule-
ment should not become a vehicle for requiring the admission of mas-
sive numbers of migrants.""' During the 1951 conference, the Dutch
representative expressed his government's view that "the possibility of
mass migrations across frontiers or of attempted mass migrations was
not covered by Article 33:"
Baron van BOETZELAER (Netherlands) recalled that at the
first reading the Swiss representative had expressed the opinion
that the word 'expulsion' related to a refugee already admitted
into a country, whereas the word 'return' ('refoulement') related
to a refugee already within the territory but not yet resident there.
According to that interpretation, article 28 would not have in-
volved any obligations in the possible case of mass migrations
across frontiers or of attempted mass migrations.
He wished to revert to that point, because the Netherlands Gov-
ernment attached very great. importance to the scope of the provi-
sion now contained in article 33. The Netherlands could not ac-
cept any legal obligations in respect of large groups of refugees
seeking access to its territory.
At the first reading the representatives of Belgium, the Federal
Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden had
supported the Swiss interpretation. From conversations he had
since had with other representatives, he had gathered that the
general consensus of opinion was in favour of the Swiss
interpretation.
In order to dispel any possible ambiguity and to reassure his
Government, he wished to have it placed on record that the Con-
ference was in agreement with the interpretation that the possibil-
ity of mass migrations across frontiers or of attempted mass mi-
statement the previous year, cited [above], continued as the official position of the United
States government with regard to the meaning of Article 33. Mr. Warren took no action to
rescind that interpretation or to support any other interpretation.
Henkin Affidavit 1 9.
46. Summary Record of the Twentieth Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness
and Related Problems, held Feb. 1, 1950, supra note 45, at 12-13.
47. See Henkin Affidavit, supra note 45, at 1 7.
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grations was not covered by article 33.
There being no objection, the PRESIDENT [of the Confer-
ence] ruled that the interpretation given by the Netherlands rep-
resentative should be placed on record."8
The content and form of these minutes raise more questions than
they answer, as discussed below. But most importantly, mass migration
has no bearing on the issue of where a refugee must be in order to
trigger the nonrefoulement obligation of Article 33. As the Dutch dele-
gate indicated, those involved in a mass migration may cross or attempt
to cross borders, so that they may be inside the territory of a country of
refuge or outside those borders. The mass migration concern is simply
not one about a refugee's location in relation to a country of refuge, but
rather focuses on the number of refugees that may have crossed or are
attempting to cross the border.
Moreover, the Dutch delegate's interpretation certainly does not sug-
gest that a contracting state remains free beyond its borders to seize
refugees and place them back in the hands of their persecutors. Such
collaboration with persecuting authorities was a heinous act that the
drafters regarded as contrary to the purpose of the Convention.49
That, however, is the issue in McNary. As the Second Circuit ob-
served, whatever the Dutch delegate meant by his interpretaion, collab-
oration was not part of his message:
He may well have meant only that his country would be free to-
close its borders in the face of a threat of mass migration, leaving
fleeing refugees the opportunity to make their way (by land or air)
to some other haven. But his concern not to accept 'any legal obli-
gations,' even if shared by others considering the treaty, would not
have meant that his country could go beyond the negative act of
closing its border and take the affirmative steps of seizing refugees
approaching the border and forcibly carrying them back to the
custody of those from whom they are fleeing. 50
If the mass migration interpretation of Article 33 relates to a con-
tracting State's ability to prevent mass migrations into a country, that
is, admission,51 then the interpretation may simply mean that Article
48. Summary Record of the Thirty-fifth Meeting of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on
the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, held July 25, 1951, at 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/
SR 35 (1951).
49. See, e.g., Summary Record of the Fortieth Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee, held Aug.
22, 1950, 2d Sess. at 33, U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/SR.40 (1950) (Statement of French Delegate, Mr.
Juvigny: "'any possibility, even in exceptional circumstances, of a genuine refugee ... being re-
turned to his country of origin would not only be absolutely inhuman, but was contrary to the very
purpose of the Convention.").
50. McNary, 969 F.2d. at 1366.
51. See P. Weis, The United Nations Declaration on Territorial Asylum, 7 CAN. Y.B. INT'L
L. 92, 123-24 (1969) (observing that the negotiating history does not completely clarify the mean-
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33 would not obligate a party to let in (across frontiers) mass move-
ments of refugees.52 As previously discussed, 53 the power to refuse ad-
mission is not to be confused with the power to return a refugee to a
country of persecution. While the Convention does not limit a con-
tracting state's power to refuse admission, it does generally remove that
State's power to return refugees to countries of persecution.
Even if the meaning of the Dutch delegate's interpretation were
clear, the form of the minutes raises doubts as to the existence of an
agreement concerning this interpretation. The minutes simply state
that the Dutch interpretation was to be placed on record. They do not
state that the twenty-six delegates, or even a majority of them,
"agreed" to or "adopted" the interpretation, as was the practice.5 4
The fact that no objections were raised does not, in the politeness of
international negotiations and in the absence of the interpretation being
"'agreed" to or "adopted," 55 indicate that an agreement had been
reached. 56 Indeed, the United States and Israeli delegates expressed a
contrary view earlier in the negotiations. 7
In sum, even if the terms of the treaty were to raise serious doubts as
to the applicability of the nonrefoulement obligation outside a con-
tracting state's territory, which I do not believe they do, the negotiating
history of the Convention does not answer such doubts. The only evi-
dence from the negotiating history offered as proof that Article 33 does
not apply on the high seas58 concerns mass migration, but that issue
ing of "return," and that "[als regards the question of admission, it was stated that the Article
involved no obligations in the case of mass migration of refugees across frontiers or of attempted
mass migrations.") (emphasis added).
52. Respondents argue that this is what the Dutch interpretation means. Respondents' Brief at
27, McNary v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992) (No. 92-344).
53. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
54. See, e.g., Summary Record of the Thirty-Fifth Meeting of the Conference of Plenipoten-
tiaries, supra note 48, at 33-34 ("It was . . . agreed" to adopt Article 45 as interpreted by the
President). The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) views
the fact that the Dutch delegate's comments were merely placed on the record rather than
"agreed" to or "adopted" as "a tacit acknowledgement that the views he expressed did not enjoy
sufficient support to alter the actual language of the treaty .... The process of placing comments
on the record did not reflect agreement with such comments, only that they were recorded and
preserved." Brief of the Office of the UNHCR as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at
26-27, McNary v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, cert. granted 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992) (No. 92-344).
55. Agreements reached by the delegates were always "adopted," "agreed" to, or "approved",
including those indicating no objection. Summary Record of the Second Meeting of the Ad Hoc
Committee, held Jan. 17, 1950, 1st Sess. at 4, U.N. Doe. E/AC.32/SR.2 (1950); Summary Rec-
ord of the Eighth Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee, held Jan. 23, 1950, 1st Sess. at 7, U.N.
Doc. E/AC.32/SR.8 (1950); Summary Record of the Eleventh Meeting of the Ad Hoc Commit-
tee, held Jan. 25, 1950, 1st Sess. at 11, U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/SR.I I (1950).
56. The history of mass movements of refugees in Europe indicates that some governments did
not share the concerns of small countries. France, for example, admitted 400,000 refugees from
Spain in just ten days in 1939. Kiss, Rpertoire de la pratique francaise en droit international
public (1966) iv. 433-35, as cited in GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 35, at 71.
57. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
58. See Petitioners' Brief at 42-43, McNary v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, cert. granted 113 S. Ct.
52 (1992) (No. 92-344); McNary, 969 F.2d at 1377-79 (Walker, J., dissenting); Haitian Refugee
1993]
84 GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL
does not bear on where refugees must be to qualify for protection. The
Dutch interpretation of Article 33 may simply relate to a contracting
state's power to refuse admission to refugees. But that in no way re-
stricts the nonrefoulement obligation. Even if the Dutch interpretation
were relevant to the issue of where Article 33 is applicable, the form of
the minutes leaves considerable doubt as to the existence of any agree-
ment on the interpretation. As such, the negotiating history is not au-
thoritative for purposes of restricting the scope of Article 33.19 It surely
cannot be relied on exclusively, as Judge Edwards did in Gracey. AbOve
all, there is certainly no suggestion in the negotiating history that any
government "sought to reserve the right to reach out beyond its bor-
ders, seize potential refugees, and return them into the hands of their
oppressors." 60
VI. CONCLUSION
The nonrefoulement obligation was so fundamental a protection that
the drafters did not permit contracting states to make reservations to
Article 33. The terms of the obligation do not restrict its application to
refugees within a country of refuge, which the drafters did not hesitate
to do when appropriate. Because the meaning of Article 33's terms is
clear-as it was to the United States government when the Haitian
interdiction program was created-resort to the negotiating history of
the Convention is inappropriate. Even if the terms of Article 33 were
ambiguous, the negotiating history does not resolve any ambiguity, and
the less restrictive construction is preferred.
What is most outrageous about the United States position regarding
Article 33 is that it proffers a nefarious reading of the Convention.
There is simply no way that the drafters could have created and the
ratifiers adopted an instrument that would allow a contracting state to
reach out onto the high seas and, in collusion with a persecuting re-
gime, physically return refugees to that regime. As one commentator
has observed:
If we are to accept the government's theory, then the President
would have the legitimate power-under both federal law and in-
ternational law-to deploy the U.S. Coast Guard to track down
refugees on the high seas and forcibly repatriate them to certain
Ctr. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d. 794, 840 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
59. See Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 342 (1924) ("Treaties are to be construed in
a broad and liberal spirit, and, when two constructions are possible, one restrictive of rights that
may be claimed under it and the other favorable to them, the latter is to be preferred." (citations
omitted)).
60. Henkin Affidavit supra note 45, at V 7.
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persecution or death in the country from which they fled.6 '
That the United States has summarily returned refugees to their per-
secutors is a moral shame. That the nation's highest lawyers have at-
tempted to secure this end by making a "cruel hoax" 6 of the Conven-
tion's most fundamental protection represents a cynical disrespect for
the rule of law, just as the United States hopes to lead the way into the
"new world order."
61. David J. Scheffer, The Supreme Court Considers the Kennebunkport Order, 55 INT'L
PRAC. NOTEBOOK 5 (1992).
62. These are the words of District Court Judge Johnson quoted in McNary, 969 F.2d at
1353. He called the government's actions, involving the return of "refugees to the jaws of political
persecution, terror, death and uncertainty when [the U.S.] has contracted not to do so," "uncon-
scionable" and "particularly hypocritical given its condemnation of other countries who have re-
fused to abide by the principle of non-refoulement." Id.; Petitioners' Appendix at 167a, McNary
v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992) (No. 92-344) (footnote citing U.S.
criticism of Great Britain for its forcible repatriation of Vietnamese boat people omitted).
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